China’s Economic Diplomacy in Africa:
Strategic Partnership or Neo-Dependency?
Jyot Shikhar Singh
PhD Scholar, Jindal School of International Affairs
O.P. Jindal Global University
E-mail: jssingh@jgu.edu.in
Introduction
China’s expanding economic engagement in Africa has become one of the most significant global political and economic developments, sparking optimism and concern among scholars and policymakers. Over the past two decades, it has positioned itself as Africa’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade reaching $262 billion in 2023 (China Africa Research Initiative [CARI], 2024). Through large-scale infrastructure investments, loans, and trade agreements, Beijing’s presence in Africa reshapes economic structures and development trajectories. However, this deepening economic relationship raises fundamental questions about the nature of this economic engagement: Is this a mutually beneficial partnership, fostering economic growth and self-reliance, or does it represent a new form of economic/financial dependency, echoing historical patterns of external control over African economies? A critical investigation into this question allows the academic community to elucidate the broader implications of Beijing’s economic diplomacy in the Global South.
This article critically examines whether the growing Chinese investments in Africa align with South-South cooperation principles or risk creating a modern dependency structure that mirrors neocolonial economic patterns. While proponents argue that Chinese investment fosters modernization through infrastructure development, technology transfer, and industrialization (Simonov, 2025; McBride, Berman, & Chatzky, 2023), the antithesis suggests debt sustainability issues, trade imbalances, and resource extraction as evidence of growing dependency (Carmody & Kragelund, 2016). This article analyses the long-term implications of China’s economic model in Africa, assessing whether it empowers African nations or limits their economic sovereignty.
The Rise of China-Africa Economic Relations
China’s economic engagement with Africa has dramatically transformed since the late 20th century, evolving from ideological solidarity to a complex web of trade, investment, and infrastructural development. In the 2000s, trade between China and Africa stood at a modest $10 billion, but by 2023, it had surged to $262 billion, making China Africa’s largest bilateral trading partner (CARI, 2024). China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which was introduced in 2013, has greatly increased investment in important industries like manufacturing, energy, transportation, and telecommunications, hence facilitating this growing partnership. Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have played a central role in financing and constructing major infrastructure projects, including Ethiopia’s Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway (Bovenizer, 2024), Kenya’s Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway (Rogers, 2025), and Angola’s hydropower plants (EnergyNews, 2024). These projects, often funded by low-interest loans from Chinese banks, have been praised for modernizing African economies and enhancing regional connectivity (Obeng-Odoom, 2022).
The building of infrastructure has been acknowledged as a driver of economic expansion but questions over the sustainability of debt and trade imbalances have cast doubt on the long-term effects of China’s economic diplomacy. Africa’s trade relationship with China remains heavily skewed, with the continent primarily exporting raw materials while importing manufactured goods and high-tech equipment (Qobo & le Pere, 2017). There are concerns about a contemporary dependency trap because this economic pattern is remarkably like the trade dynamics of the colonial era, when African economies were set up as resource providers to industrialized nations (Mason, 2016). Chinese financing has certainly aided in the continent’s development, but the opaqueness of loan contracts, together with claims of asset seizures and concealed debt terms, has raised doubts about China’s long-term goals in Africa (Mutai et al., 2024). This scepticism does indeed force academics and policymakers to ponder over the fact whether Beijing’s approach to investment and development has a malicious or an ulterior motive embedded. A deeper examination of whether this connection offers a chance for economic sovereignty or a redesigned dependency is made possible by the dichotomy of China’s involvement as both a development partner and a possible creditor imposing economic limits.
Narrative of China-Africa Partnership
China’s engagement with Africa is presented as a narrative of a ‘win-win partnership’. Scholars argue that China’s investments have significantly boosted Africa’s development trajectory, particularly in areas where Western financial institutions have been hesitant to invest (Chen, Dollar, & Tang, 2018; Zakari & Khan, 2021). Beijing adopts a non-interventionist stance, allowing African governments to obtain finance without being subject to structural adjustment mandates, in contrast to the IMF and World Bank, which frequently impose austerity-driven conditions (Mumuni, 2017).
China’s influence extends to technology transfer and skill development, particularly in the telecommunications and energy sectors. Companies such as Huawei and ZTE have expanded digital infrastructure, making China instrumental in Africa’s digital economy. Similarly, investments in renewable energy and agriculture have created opportunities for knowledge-sharing and capacity-building, which African leaders view as a departure from exploitative Western economic models.
However, the power asymmetry within this partnership remains evident. African states often lack bargaining power in negotiations, leading to contracts that disproportionately favour Chinese firms (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2016). The “No-strings-attached” approach can lead to governance concerns, as authoritarian regimes exploit Chinese funding without accountability measures (Maggiorelli, 2019). On the foundation of short-term economic gain, the long-term question remains: Is this engagement fostering sustainable development, or merely reinforcing economic dependency under a new framework? Is this development partnership creating pathways where an independent African economic power can emerge? Any economic partnership’s primary objective is to help the parties invest the available finances for long-term development or change their strategy so that the nation can design its growth paths. However, the scholarly focus should be on resolving the underlying one-sided relationship if the discussion is pushed toward a parasitic relationship, such as debt-diplomacy, rather than optimism.
The Debt Trap Diplomacy Debate
One of the most contentious aspects of China-Africa economic relations is the concern over debt sustainability and the notion of “debt trap diplomacy.” Critics argue that China’s loan-driven approach, particularly under BRI, has placed several African nations in precarious financial positions, raising fears of sovereign debt distress (Landry, 2024). As of 2022, China accounted for approximately 12% of Africa’s external debt, with countries like Zambia, Kenya, and Angola holding significant obligations to Chinese lenders (Ngutjinazo, 2024). Zambia’s default on its sovereign debt in 2020, followed by mounting repayment challenges in Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway project, has intensified debates about whether China’s economic diplomacy is fostering development or exploiting financial vulnerabilities.
China points to Beijing’s debt restructuring arrangements, such as the 2021 suspension of Angola’s oil-backed loan repayments, as proof of its generosity and adaptability. However, there are significant worries regarding Africa’s long-term financial independence due to the opaque nature of Chinese loan deals, which frequently include collateral clauses and asset seizures. Rumours that similar situations might occur in Africa’s infrastructure projects have been stoked by reports that China was granted a 99-year lease on Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port following a loan default.
Whether African states have enough discretion in loan negotiations or if structural disparities restrict their bargaining power is a central point of dispute in this discussion. Despite China’s portrayal as a South-South partner, it is impossible to overlook the existence of unequal financial leverage. African countries run the risk of becoming trapped in a cycle of chronic debt if debt commitments keep increasing without corresponding increases in economic production and income collection. This raises a fundamental question: Is China’s economic engagement a pathway to self-sufficiency or a modern iteration of external financial control?
V. Trade Imbalances & Resource Extraction
Even though China’s economic involvement in Africa has sparked a great deal of industrialization and infrastructural development, the two countries’ trading relationship is still quite lopsided, raising questions about the economy’s long-term viability. While China’s exports to Africa are mostly made up of manufactured goods, electronics, and industrial machinery, Africa’s exports to China are primarily made up of raw materials like oil, minerals, lumber, and agricultural commodities (Brautigam, 2020; Carmody, 2017). This pattern reflects a neo-extractive economic model, where African nations remain resource suppliers, limiting their ability to develop value-added industries and diversify their economies (Taylor, 2021). As a result, while trade volumes between Africa and China continue to grow, African economies struggle with low industrialization, external dependency, and weak manufacturing bases.
A prime example of this trade imbalance is Angola’s oil exports, which account for over 70% of its trade with China (Zhou & Esteban, 2018). Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) exports vast amounts of cobalt and copper for China’s rapidly expanding electric vehicle (EV) industry, yet very little of this wealth translates into local industrial growth (Jureńczyk, 2020). As demonstrated by the 2014 oil price drop, which sent Angola and Nigeria into economic crises, Africa’s economies are instead vulnerable to global price instability due to their excessive reliance on commodities exports (Gulley, 2023). Beijing’s large-scale investments in mining and logging have raised environmental concerns, with reports of deforestation, water pollution, and exploitative labour conditions in Chinese-operated sites in Zambia, Ghana, and Sudan (Madubuegwu et al., 2022).
Defenders of China’s trade policies argue that Africa benefits from preferential trade agreements, such as China’s tariff-free access for certain African exports (Huang et al., 2017). To encourage domestic manufacturing, China has also made investments in industrial parks and special economic zones (SEZs). One example of this is Ethiopia’s Hawassa Industrial Park, which resulted in a mass generation of jobs. Critics counter that these efforts are still too little and that many African nations are still having difficulty transitioning from exporting raw materials to industrial economies that can support themselves. Instead of promoting true economic autonomy, Africa’s trade reliance on China may exacerbate structural economic deficiencies without more robust measures to support local value chains. This raises the critical question: Is China’s engagement facilitating Africa’s economic diversification, or is it perpetuating a cycle of resource dependency under a new global order?
The Way Forward: Building a More Balanced China-Africa Relationship
The challenge facing China-Africa economic connections as they continue to grow is to make sure that this engagement moves past debt vulnerability and resource dependency to a model that promotes equitable and sustainable development. Even while China’s investments have substantially contributed to the development of infrastructure, industrialization, and regional connectivity, African countries still need to be proactive to optimize the advantages of this collaboration while minimizing its hazards. Greater transparency in loan agreements, a wider range of economic collaborations, and more robust domestic policy frameworks that enable African countries to prioritize long-term economic independence and negotiate fairer conditions are all necessary for a more sustainable and balanced China-Africa relationship.
One key step toward sustainability is enhancing transparency in Chinese loan agreements and investment projects. Several African countries have struggled with opaque debt arrangements, where contract terms, including collateral clauses and repayment schedules, remain hidden from public scrutiny (Barnekow & Kulkarni, 2017). Greater public accountability mechanisms and parliamentary oversight in African nations can prevent unfavourable agreements and strengthen financial resilience (Carmody, Taylor, & Zajontz, 2021). Reducing excessive reliance on China also requires diversifying economic alliances. To increase their negotiating strength and competitiveness in the market, African nations should deepen their trade and investment ties with other international entities, such as the European Union, India, and regional economic blocs (Sovacool, Fourie, & Tan-Mullins, 2019). Strengthening intra-African trade through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) can help reduce reliance on external actors and foster a more integrated African economy (Bodomo & Che, 2020).
African agencies must participate in economic discussions with greater power to guarantee that Chinese investments promote long-term development rather than reaffirm structural dependency. Legislators should enact explicit industrial policies that prioritize local content requirements, technology transfer, and skill development. It is also possible to promote greater economic sovereignty and information sharing by supporting joint ventures between Chinese and African companies instead of permitting sole Chinese ownership of important industries. China is still a vital economic partner, but African organizations, laws, and strategic choices must determine how this relationship develops. Whether African countries can successfully negotiate the challenges of economic diplomacy, defend their interests, and convert foreign investments into real development possibilities will determine the future of China-Africa relations. If carefully managed, this partnership has the potential to serve as a model for South-South cooperation, but without deliberate action, it risks reproducing historical patterns of economic dependency under a new framework.
Conclusion
China’s economic engagement in Africa represents both an opportunity and a challenge for the continent’s development trajectory. On one hand, China has played a crucial role in modernizing Africa’s infrastructure, enhancing industrial capacity, and expanding access to global markets through initiatives like the BRI. Its non-interventionist approach, coupled with substantial financial investments, has provided African states with an alternative development model, distinct from the conditionality-driven policies of Western financial institutions. However, on the other hand, persistent concerns over debt sustainability, trade imbalances, and resource dependency cast a shadow over the long-term viability of this relationship. The fundamental question remains: Is China’s economic diplomacy in Africa a catalyst for self-reliance, or does it reinforce structural dependency under a new South-South framework?
The analysis in this article demonstrates that while China’s development-oriented investments have positively contributed to Africa’s economic landscape, they have also reconfigured patterns of external dependency. The reliance on Chinese loans and raw material exports, coupled with opaque loan agreements and limited value-chain integration, suggests that African economies must take proactive steps to assert agency in negotiations and diversify economic partnerships. This requires greater transparency in loan agreements, increased regional economic integration through mechanisms like AfCFTA, and stronger domestic policies to ensure industrialization and local capacity-building.
The future of China-Africa relations hinges on Africa’s ability to navigate this economic partnership strategically. If African governments prioritize structural economic transformation, ensuring that Chinese investments contribute to technological advancement, job creation, and sustainable growth, then this engagement could serve as a model for South-South cooperation rather than another chapter in Africa’s history of external economic reliance. However, if these critical reforms are not pursued, there is a risk that China’s presence in Africa could evolve into a neo-dependency model, replicating past economic patterns under a new global power structure. As China continues to expand its influence in Africa, the onus remains on African policymakers, scholars, and civil society to ensure that this engagement leads to genuine economic empowerment rather than a cycle of dependency.
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Author:
Jyot Shikhar Singh is a PhD Scholar at the Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University, India. His research focuses on examining whether there is a distinct Right-Wing Populist Foreign Policy Approach, analysing case studies of India, Russia, Turkey, and Hungary. He holds an MSc in International Relations from the University of Edinburgh, where his interest in populism studies deepened. With a strong foundation in critical theory and post-Marxist approaches, he aims to contribute to advancing populism studies by integrating cultural and political dimensions. Jyot is passionate about interdisciplinary research and fostering academic dialogue within populism studies.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the Global South Research Foundation or its members.